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PROPERTY: SPRING v. LITTLE: LANDLORD-TENANT
LAW APPROACHES THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
RICHARD C. GROLL*
When the American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek "shelter" today,
they seek a well known package of goods and services-a package which
includes not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and
ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors,
proper sanitation, and proper maintenance.'
HILE THIS "well known package" may represent the expec-
tations of an urban dweller when he rents an apartment, the
crucial question is: Do his expectations represent enforce-
able rights? The Illinois Supreme Court has taken the first step to-
wards realization of the package in Spring v. Little.2
The supreme court opinion dealt with two cases, consolidated by
the appellate court because of their similarity.
SPRING V. LITTLE
Emma Little entered into an oral lease with Jack Spring on Au-
gust 1, 1961, to rent an apartment located at 3901 West Jackson
Boulevard in the City of Chicago. After a series of renewals of the
lease, the tenant, Little, alleged that on August 1, 1967, an agree-
ment was reached to renew the lease for another term. In order to
entice this renewal, the landlord, Spring, allegedly, orally promised
to: place screens on all windows throughout the demised premises;
replace rotten window sashes; repair defective electrical sockets; and
redecorate the apartment. When the promised performance was
not delivered, Little stopped paying rent. When eviction was
sought, the tenant resisted, theorizing that the landlord's failure to
properly maintain the demised premises is a defense to plaintiff's
action.
* Professor and Dean of the College of Law, DePaul University; J.D., Loyola
University; LL.M., Northwestern University.
1. Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
2. 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
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SUTTON & PETERSON, INC. V. PRICE
Price entered into a written lease with Sutton & Peterson, Inc. on
December 17, 1966, for an apartment in Chicago. The lease was
renewed on April 4, 1968, and, allegedly, the landlord's agent orally
promised that: all violations of the Chicago Housing Code would
be cured; water damage to plaster and paint would be repaired; the
halls and stairways would be adequately lighted; a workable buzzer
system would be installed; adequate and safe electrical systems
would be installed; and various animals harbored in the basement
would be eliminated. Acting in a manner similar to that of tenant
Little, tenant Price withheld rent when the promised maintenance
work was not performed.
Unprecedented affirmative defenses for resisting eviction were
proffered by the tenants in these cases.' In each instance, there
were numerous defects upon the demised premises, representing vi-
olations of the Chicago Housing Code. Such defects, in the eyes
of the tenant, rendered the premises unfit and unsafe for human
habitation and, therefore, caused the landlord to breach an implied
warranty of habitability. Each tenant urged the court to view the
tenant's promise to pay rent as dependent upon the landlord's im-
plied obligation to provide a habitable apartment.
WHAT IMPLIED WARRANTY?
The essential nature of the relationship between landlord and ten-
ant developed in feudal England.4 Having its origins in an agrarian
society, the lease has been viewed primarily as a conveyance of
a less-than-freehold estate and usual contract principles do not nec-
essarily apply.' The landlord's prime duty has been to execute a
valid conveyance and refrain from disturbing the tenant's peaceable
possession of the demised premises.' In return, the creation of a
tenancy obligated the tenant to pay rent. This obligation to pay
was not generally terminated unless the tenant was dispossessed by
the landlord's interfering action.
3. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57 (1971).
4. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
5. Id.
6. See generally Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical
Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225
(1969).
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Traditionally, the most basic legal principle governing the rela-
tionship was the doctrine of caveat emptor-i.e., the lease contained
no warranty that the demised premises were fit for habitation.7
Another governing concept was the independent covenant doc-
trine." As the landlord-tenant relationship was viewed primarily as
a conveyance of land, all covenants entered into between the parties
were deemed incidental. A two-level analysis has been applied in
describing the relationship. 9 The basic or essential level involved
the exchange of the implied quiet enjoyment duty for the payment
of rent. A second tier developed as society became more urban-
ized. For instance, if a tenant renting an apartment was to receive
light, decorating or the like, the failure of the landlord to fulfill
these requirements at this level did not give the tenant the right to
terminate. 10 In general, when faced with breach, the tenant's rem-
edy was at law and recovery was limited to money damages."
The concept of independence of covenants was applicable even to
7. The doctrine of caveat emptor is predicated on the assumption that the
tenant inspects the demised premises and based thereupon decides to rent or not,
depending upon his preferences. It has, therefore, been diminished in its harsh ap-
plication where the landlord knows or has reason to know of a latent defect (i.e.,
one which the tenant would not normally discover at the time of his initial inspec-
tion of the demised premises), existing at the commencement of the tenancy.
Failure to disclose this defect may lead to tort liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
TORTS § 356 (1965). In addition, subsequent discovery of the defect, assuming
it is material, may allow the tenant the option of rescission. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 102-103 (3d ed. 1964). See also Sanford v. Lee, 248 Mich. 496, 227
N.W. 695 (1929); Clark v. Lewis, 139 Ark. 308, 213 S.W. 746 (1919).
Another exception has been drawn where the demised premises are rented fully
furnished for short-term residential purposes. This exception has been drawn be-
cause the nature of the transaction is such that the tenant should not reasonably be
expected to inspect the premises. See also Smith v. Marrable, 152 Eng. Rep. 693
(1843); Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
A final exception has been created when the tenant entered into a lease for
premises yet to be constructed, since there is, obviously, no opportunity for the
tenant to inspect. See Woolford v. Electronic Appliances, 24 Cal. App. 2d 385, 75
P.2d 112 (1938).
8. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 6, at 233.
9. Casner, supra note 4, at § 3.47.
10. "[P]artly because a lease is regarded primarily as a conveyance by the
common law, partly because the law governing leases has been dealt with in con-
nection with the law of real estate, and became settled before the law of mutually
dependent promises was established, and partly no doubt because leases have ordi-
narily been elaborately written documents in which the parties might be supposed to
have expressed their intent with considerable fullness ....... 3 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 890, at 2520 (Rev. ed. 1936).
11. Rubens v. Hill, 213 Ill. 523, 72 N.E. 1127 (1904).
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promises obligating the landlord to maintain the demised premises.
If the tenant were in a position of equal bargaining strength,' 2 the
use of an express lease covenant would be an appropriate method
of providing adequate maintenance. However, even if the tenant is
able to secure a covenant obligating the landlord to repair, tradi-
tional concepts place the renter in a less than ideal position." Lease
provisions to repair have been viewed to be independent of the duty
to pay rent, and breach does not grant the tenant an option to termi-
nate. 4
Applying early common law principles, a doctrine of eviction ex-
isted, but afforded very few remedies to the tenant. 15 Should a
tenant be physically evicted by the title paramount of another, the
obligation to pay rent was suspended. While contract principles
could have been utilized to reach this result, maxims of property law
were brought into play in order to avoid a substantial departure from
the past. The tenant's obligation to pay rent under these circum-
stances was ended based on the theory that the land would not earn
the rent for payment in turn to the landlord.' 6 The title paramount
of another released the tenant as a breach of the covenant of quiet
12. "[No longer does the average prospective tenant occupy a free bargaining
status and no longer do the average landlord-to-be and tenant-to-be negotiate a
lease on an 'arm's length' basis. Premises which, under normal circumstances,
would be completely unattractive for rental are now, by necessity, at a premium.
If our law is to keep in tune with our times we must recognize the present day
inferior position of the average tenant vis-a-vis the landlord when it comes to nego-
tiating a lease." Rectmeyer v. Sprecker, 431 Pa. 284, 290, 243 A.2d 395, 398
(1968).
13. 3 WILuSTON, CONTRACTS § 890 (Rev. ed. 1936).
14. When the landlord is in breach of a covenant of repair, the tenant must, if
the defects are of a minor nature, make the repairs himself and sue the landlord
for the cost. If, however, the defects are substantial, the tenant may sue for
damages-the difference between the value of the premises in-repair and out-of-
repair. Oppenheimer v. Szulerecki, 297 I11. 81, 130 N.E. 325 (1921).
The tenant, faced with breach, may plead the cost of repairs or damages as a
set-off when sued for rent due and owing. However, Illinois had not, until re-
cently, allowed the tenant to raise the issue when being sued for possession.
Compare Rubens v. Hill, 213 Ill. 523, 72 N.E. 1127 (1904) with Truman v. Redesch,
168 Ill. App. 304 (1912). This distinction has been changed by Spring v. Little,
50 I11. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972). See note 39 infra and corresponding text.
Finally, where the defects are of a substantial nature, the tenant need not make
the repairs himself and hence the doctrine of constructive eviction may be available
as a remedy, infra note 18 and corresponding text.
15. Rapacz, Origins & Evolution of Constructive Eviction in the United States,
I DEPAUL L. REv. 69, 72 (1951).
16. Id. at 73.
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enjoyment. The early case of Pendleton v. Dyett17 introduced the
concept of constructive eviction in the United States. In a black-
letter law fashion, this doctrine has the effect of discharging the ten-
ant from his obligation to pay rent when the landlord or his agent
breaches a duty owed which substantially interferes with the ten-
ant's beneficial enjoyment of the premises, provided the tenant aban-
dons the demised premises within a reasonable time.18
While there has been considerable liberalizaton of the doctrine
as originally promulgated, the tenant's remedy is predicated upon a
showing that the deficiency in the condition of the demised premises
results from the breach of some duty owed by the landlord. How-
ever, the doctrine of constructive eviction has not, in general, obvi-
ated the more basic concept of caveat emptor.'9 It has not in the
course of time reformed the notion that a tenant must inspect the
premises and rent or not, according to his preferences. The initial
minimum condition of the premises has continued to be determined
by the strength of the tenant's bargaining position, which, in eras
of housing shortage, is nonexistent.
A myriad of solutions have been offered in order to place upon the
landlord a threshold duty with respect to the condition of the prem-
ises being rented. Each attempts to assist the tenant in his bargain-
ing with landlords. The most common solution proffered by courts
and writers is an implied warranty of habitability. 0
SURVEY OF APPROACHES
To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in leases would, in our
opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative policy concerning housing stand-
ards. The need and social desirability of adequate housing for people in this era of
rapid population increases is too important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious legal
clich6, caveat emptor.
2 1
17. 4 Cow. 581 (N.Y. 1825).
18. As traditionally applied, the doctrine of constructive eviction was applicable
only when each of the following elements were satisfied: (1) the landlord, or his
agent, must intentionally act or fail to act in violation of an expressed or inferred
obligation; (2) the act or omission must cause a material deprivation of the ten-
ant's use and beneficial enjoyment of the premises; and (3) the tenant must vacate
the premises within a reasonable length of time. See generally Rapacz, supra
note 15; Casner, supra note 4, at § 3.51.
19. Rapacz, supra note 15, at 80.
20. See generally Peters, Implied Warranty of Habitability: An Incipient Trend
in the Law of Landlord-Tenant, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 123 (1971).
21. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 596, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (1961).
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In Pines v. Perssion,22 several University of Wisconsin students
rented a furnished house. After extended efforts to bring the prem-
ises into an adequate state of repair, they brought an action to re-
scind the lease, recover their rent deposit and a sum equivalent to
the value of their maintenance labors. In treating this situation, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court implied from the existence of building
codes a policy judgment that dwellings should be habitable. The
court also cited the shortage of adequate housing as a factor in
reaching their result. The solution presented was the creation of an
implied warranty which the lessor in the instant case had breached
because the house, as rented, had defective plumbing, heating and
wiring-all of which violated applicable building codes.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in Lemle v. Breeden,2" was con-
fronted with a tenant who abandoned a Tahitian-style home near
Diamond Head when it was discovered that the house was rat-in-
fested. The court decided to use this fact situation to announce:
The application of an implied warranty of habitability in leases gives recognition to
changes in leasing transactions today. It affirms the fact that a lease is, in essence,
a sale as well as a transfer of an estate in land and is, more importantly, a con-
tractual relationship.24
Given the contractual nature of the modern landlord-tenant relation-
ship, the Hawaii court proceeded to justify the creation of an implied
warranty of habitability and fitness for use by contemporary anal-
ogies.
It is a doctrine [an implied warranty] which has its counterparts in the law of sales
and torts and one which when candidly countenanced is impelled by the nature of
the transaction and contemporary housing realities. 25
The case which appears to have generated the widest notation is
Javins v. First National Realty Corporation.26 Here, an action for
possession was instituted against a nonpaying tenant. The tenant
raised as a defense the existence of numerous violations of the appli-
cable housing code. In attacking this fact situation, the United States
court of appeals not only announced the existence of an implied
22. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
23. 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
24. Id. at 433, 462 P.2d at 474.
25. Id.
26. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
[Vol. XXII: 51
PROPERTY
warranty, but held that general contract principles should apply
between landlord and tenant.
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT
Citing Javins extensively, the Illinois Supreme Court utilized the
conflict between Jack Spring and Emma Little to announce:
[We hold that included in the contract, both oral and written, governing the ten-
ancies of the defendants in the multiple unit dwellings occupied by them, is an im-
plied warranty of habitability .... 27
The court set forth at length the reasons supporting the imposition
of this warranty. It reviewed the common law doctrine of caveat
emptor which originated in an agrarian society where the under-
standable emphasis was upon the income-producing character of the
soil. The mid-twentieth century urban dweller, however, bargains
for the residential unit and not for fertile soil. The court also ren-
dered an interesting commentary in which it contrasted the "jack-of-
all-trades" farmer of previous generations and the simple accouter-
ments of the 19th century farming homes with the complex appa-
ratus which typify an urban apartment complex. Finally, the court
reasoned that the typical city resident-at least those in need of pro-
tection-had neither the means nor desire to invest a substantial
amount of money in their short-term housing unit.
Though articulating the existence of an implied warranty, the cru-
cial question becomes: when is there a breach? The warranty, in
the words of the supreme court, is "fulfilled by substantial compli-
ance with the pertinent provisions of the Chicago building code. ''28
While it was determined that the defendants had sufficiently shown
violation of the standard to order a reversal and remand, the real
impact of the decision will only be realized when this tight phrase
is defined.
The District of Columbia court in Javins v. First National Realty
Corporation,2" the case so heavily cited by the Illinois Supreme
Court, set their standard of habitability as full compliance with the
27. 50 Ill. 2d at 366, 280 N.E.2d at 217.
28. Id.
29. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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applicable building code, but did cite that minor violations, unre-
lated to habitability, would not constitute breach.
There is, obviously, great apprehension as to how this standard
will be applied. This fear was articulated by Mr. Justice Kluczyn-
ski in his dissenting opinion:
The rule of law established by the opinion will do more harm than good. It will
create a maze of practical problems of substantive and procedural nature, and will
inundate the already understaffed metropolitan courts with a flood of protracted
litigation. Numerous frivolous, trivial and spurious claims will unduly delay the
termination of possessory rights in land and property.8 0
Still another crucial aspect of the landlord-tenant relationship was
left ambiguous by the supreme court opinions; to wit: what is the
tenant's remedy when faced with breach of the warranty? It ap-
pears reasonably clear that if an affirmative duty is placed upon the
landlord via the warranty, then breach should afford the tenant the
option of avoiding the tenancy by abandonment.8 ' However, the
court was quite clear that the decision should not be interpreted as
relieving the tenant of the obligation to pay rent even though he
is faced with the landlord's breach.12  The right to abandon and re-
scind is not a real remedy.13  Hence, the question is: what other
relief is available?
A remedy suggested by the New Jersey court in Marine v. Ireland8 4
would allow a tenant, faced with breach, the option of making the
necessary repairs himself and deducting the cost from future rents.
30. 50 Ill. 2d at 372, 280 N.E.2d at 220.
31. Each of the major cases cited from other jurisdictions in recognizing the ex-
istence of an implied warranty of habitability indicated that the tenant, when
faced with breach, was afforded the contract remedies of damages or rescission.
See Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961); Lemle v. Bree-
den, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Javins v. First National Realty Cor-
poration, 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
32. 50 Ill. 2d at 367, 280 N.E.2d at 217.
33. Commenting on that requirement of the doctrine of constructive eviction
which requires abandonment of the premises by the tenant, one New York court
said: "[The] rule rests upon the reasoning that if the premises in fact were not fit
for occupancy, the tenant would not have retained possession but would have
moved elsewhere, and his remaining in the premises belies any claim that they were
not fit and habitable. Such a rule should prevail where a market of available
apartment or dwelling accommodations exist. However, where there are no living
accommodations available elsewhere or there is such a scarcity of them . . . [then]
the reason upon which the rule is based disappears .... " Majen Realty Corp. v.
Glotzer, 61 N.Y.S.2d 195, 196-97 (1946).
34. 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
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While this solution does compel the landlord to place the demised
premises in a habitable state, this approach is available to few ten-
ants because they simply lack the funds to effectuate a result con-
sonant with the projected remedy.85
Another remedy is proffered by some courts by ruling that a land-
lord-tenant "contract" entered into at a time when building code vi-
olations exist is illegal. 6 Because the landlord-tenant relationship
is deemed void and unenforceable, the courts, while not treating the
tenant as a trespasser, imply a tenancy-at-will which is subject to
ready termination by either party. Such an approach represents a
simplistic approach to a complex problem. In essence, this tenant
remedy merely permits termination at will when the demised prem-
ises are not in compliance with minimum housing standards. It is,
therefore, similar to giving the tenant a right of abandonment, but
is not calculated to penalize a landlord who fails to keep the building
within the standards set by applicable housing codes. One way of
handling this approach would be to relieve the tenant of all rental
obligations until evicted by court action.
In Kline v. Burns, s 7 a somewhat cumbersome, but probably ef-
fective, remedy was suggested:
If a material or substantial breach of the implied warranty of habitability is found,
the measure of the tenant's damages is the difference between the agreed rent and
the fair rental value of the premises as they were during the occupancy by the tenant
in an unsafe, unsanitary or unfit condition. In other words, the tenant's rent liabil-
ity will be limited to the difference between the agreed rent and the reasonable
rental value in their condition while occupied.
8
Clearly, this solution may well cause a serious delay in what has been
rather routine eviction hearings;39 however, other choices do seem
35. This result is drawn by analogy to the "repair and sue doctrine" applied
where the landlord breaches an express covenant of repair, supra note 14.
36. Brown v. Southall Realty, 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968).
37. 276 A.2d 248 (N.H. 1971).
38. Id. at 252.
39. In a New Jersey case where the tenant was suing for a refund of rent al-
ready paid because of the existence of building code violations, the court com-
mented: "The most difficult aspect of this case is the determination of the amount
of abatement to which the tenant is entitled. No expert testimony was produced
to show the fair value of the premises without the services which the landlord was
required to supply. The tenant urges that this be done on a finding of fact that
there has been a percentage reduction in use which entitles the tenant to a cor-
responding abatement in rent. There is almost a complete absence of authority on
1972]
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less desirable. Merely allowing the tenant the option of abandoning
is not a meaningful remedy as the average city resident has no gen-
uine alternative (i.e., no other better place to move)."°
While not explicitly announcing that the tenant, by virtue of a
breach of the implied warranty, suffers damages which reduce his
rental obligations, the Illinois Supreme Court clearly implied that it
adopted such a rule in that section of the opinion which treated the
procedural aspects of an eviction proceeding.
Having created the implied warranty of habitability, the Illinois
Supreme Court was forced to review its impact upon the Forcible
Entry and Detainer Statute.4 ' The setting was simple. Each ten-
ant had withheld rent because, in his eyes, a breach of the warranty
existed. Not receiving the rent, the landlord proceeded to seek evic-
tion, taking a position clearly consistent with traditional property
concepts.42
In an eviction proceeding, based upon nonpayment of rent, the
Illinois statute provides:
The defendant may under a general denial of allegations of the complaint give in
evidence any matters in defense of the action. No matters not germane to the dis-
tinctive purpose of the proceeding shall be introduced by joinder, counterclaim or
otherwise.43
The question presented was: may the breach of the warranty be
raised, as a defense, in an eviction proceeding? The court simply
stated: Yes. Citing a 1937 amendment to the eviction statute,
which reads, "a claim for rent may be joined in the complaint and
judgment obtained for the amount of rent found due . . ., the
court reasoned that since the essence of the landlord's action was
predicated upon nonpayment of rent, the tenant may clearly intro-
duce evidence that, because of the breach of warranty, none was
due and owing.45 To the extent the tenant raised as an affirmative
the subject." Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Supp. 477, 485, 268 A.2d
556, 561 (1970).
40. For a study of the urban housing shortage and evidence that more than eight
million live in substandard housing units, see H.R. Rep. No. 365, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1965).
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57 (1971).
42. Supra note 10, and corresponding text.
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57, § 5 (1971).
44. Id.
45. "It would be paradoxical, indeed, to hold that if there were actions to re-
[Vol. XXII: 51
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defense the breach of express covenants to repair, the court held
this nonperformance is germane to an eviction action."
A final point dealt with by the Supreme Court in Spring v. Little
increased the rights of indigent tenants by making the appellate
process more accessible:
[In so far as section 18 of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act requires the fur-
nishing of bond as a prerequisite to prosecuting an appeal, it is violative of the four-
teenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States .... 47
CONCLUSION
While Spring v. Little takes a major step in correcting substand-
ard urban housing, it represents only the first in what will be a series
of cases defining and refining the rights of tenants. Other decisions
will undoubtedly be necessary to resolve the principal problem areas
left open by the case. Of primary importance are the following ques-
tions: 1) What violations of applicable building codes constitute a
breach of the warranty? And, 2) when faced with breach, what
does the tenant do?
Addressing the latter query, the supreme court made it abun-
dantly clear that breach does not, in and of itself, relieve the tenant
of the obligation to pay rent if he retains possession. However, the
breach can, to the extent damages are provable, reduce the amount
of rent due and owing. If a tenant, faced with breach, utilizes a
variation of "repair and sue," making the necessary repairs himself,
then the damages are established. However, if the tenant lacks the
funds to proceed in this way-how does he proceed? It can only
be assumed that the tenant should withhold all rent, and when sued
for rent or eviction raise the defense of breach and plead ready, will-
cover sums owed for rent, the defendants would be permitted to prove that damages
suffered as the result of the plaintiff's breach of warranty equaled or exceeded the
rent claimed to be due, and, therefore, that no rent was owed, and at the same
time hold that because the plaintiffs seek possession of the premises, to which admit-
tedly, they are not entitled unless rent is due and unpaid after demand, the defend-
ants are precluded from proving that because of the breach of warranty no rent
is in fact owed." 50 Ill. 2d at 359, 280 N.E.2d at 213.
46. "Insofar as defendants' affirmative defenses alleged the breach of express
covenants to repair, they were germane to the issue .... ".50 Ill. 2d at 359,
280 N.E.2d at 213.
47. 50 Ill. 2d at 355, 280 N.E.2d at 211.
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ing and able to pay the rent due over and above the damages he has
sustained.
Finally, in noting the enhanced rights of tenants, attention should
be drawn to a recent pronouncement of the Illinois legislature which
became law during 1972. This statute prohibits a landlord from
inserting exculpatory clauses to shield himself from his own negli-
gence.
Every covenant, agreement or understanding in or in connection with or collateral
to any lease of real property, exempting the lessor from liability for damages for in-
juries to person or property caused by or resulting from the negligence of the lessor,
his agents, servants or employees, in the operation or maintenance of the demised
premises or the real property containing the demised premises shall be deemed to be
void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable. 48
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, § 91 (Supp. 1972).
